Appellant: Blair T. Longley, Agent: Gowling, Lafleur & Henderson

1783 Forest Road, Suite 2600,

(Basement), 160 Elgin Street,

Victoria, B.C., Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 1C3

V8N 1H5 Tel: (613) 233-1781

Tel: (604) 477-6143 Fax: (613) 563-9869

Respondent: Judith Bowers, Q.C., Respondent’s Agent:

I. Tom Torrie, Graham Garton, Q.C.,

Department of Justice, Department of Justice,

900 - 840 Howe St., 284 Wellington Street,

Vancouver, B.C., Ottawa, Ontario,

V6Z 2S9 K1A 0H8

Tel: (604) 666-0211 Tel: (613) 957-4842

Fax: (604) 666-1462 Fax: (613) 954-1920

Appendix

Income Tax Act s. 127(3) to 127(4.1), s. 238, Regulation 2000, s. 220 & s. 245

Canada Elections Act s. 2, s. 13.1(1) to s. 13.1(10) & s. 13.8

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s. 1, s. 2(d) & s. 24(1)

[1] In 1985, I (the appellant, Blair T. Longley) was a student living on the campus of U.B.C., the University of British Columbia, when I became a registered agent of a registered political party, the Rhinoceros Party. I had thought of a way of using the political contribution tax credit provision in the Income Tax Act to provide "Rhino Bursaries" to pay tuition fees for students and to provide a political tax credit benefit to the taxpayers who supported students.

[2] My Rhino Bursaries were a particular application of my Contributor’s Choice Concept (the "CCC") which was that a contributor to a political party has the legal right to control how their contribution is spent by that party. According to the free choice made by my contributors, my CCC could permit all taxpayers to obtain some personal benefit from the use of their funds. Rhino Bursary transactions gave a tax benefit to family members and a financial benefit to me.

[3] The legal truth about my CCC is the central fact found by the trial judge. As Newbury J.A. stated in her Reasons for Judgment {para. 17, Appellant’s Record p. 267, hereinafter "A.R."}:

[4] The Chief Electoral Officer had involved Revenue Canada by sending directly to Revenue Canada copies of my letters to the Chief Electoral Officer, and his reply to me of April 30, 1985. {A.R. pp. 81 - 82} By December 15, 1986, I had made it perfectly clear to Revenue Canada that I was going to sue them for damages, if they continued to treat me in the way that they were. {A.R. pp. 130 - 134} However, Revenue Canada decided to ignore my warnings. Therefore, the truth about the law did not make any significant difference to what happened.

[5] During 1986, as a registered agent, I had the lawful right to use my Contributor’s Choice Concept go on making more of my Rhino Bursaries. Throughout 1986, Revenue Canada dishonestly asserted that the Rhino Bursaries that I had made in 1985 were not legal and would not be allowed. After that, I was not able to make more for anyone else.

[6] The doctrine of res judicata applies to the finding that my 1985 Rhino Bursaries had been legal and that Revenue Canada was dishonest when they said that those Bursaries were not legal. Since my Rhino Bursaries were lawful activities, any other sort of opinion about Rhino Bursaries based only on moral, political, or economic, considerations is an improper digression from the legal issues. Those kinds of concerns are something for the arena of political debate, not something to be discussed in the forum of legal debate. The legality of my CCC was rightly recognized by the trial judge, and because Revenue Canada did not appeal, or abandoned their appeal, there is an issue estoppel upon that finding of fact. Revenue Canada would not have been dishonest if there had been any reasonable legal basis for what they said about my CCC or about my Rhino Bursaries. To undermine the finding that my Rhino Bursaries were legal is to undermine the finding that Revenue Canada was dishonest. These two findings are inseparable.

[7] Revenue Canada did not stop saying my CCC was not legal until after they did not appeal.

[8] As the trial judge stated {para. 64, A.R. p. 219}: "By early 1985 Elections Canada had confirmed that the scheme did not offend the provisions of the Canada Elections Act."

[9] Both in 1984 and 1985, I had written to Elections Canada. {A.R. pp. 3 - 7} On April 30, 1985, the Chief Electoral Officer replied that nothing in the elections law stopped my CCC. {A.R. p. 81} He said that I "must seek the approval and permission of Revenue Canada" to issue official receipts. Finally, he said that I should seek an advance ruling on s. 127(3.1). He decided to forward my letters to him, and his reply to me, directly on to Revenue Canada.

[10] May 2, 1985, I wrote to Revenue Canada to follow up on the Chief Electoral Officer’s letter to me. {A.R. p. 83} I had explicitly requested an advance ruling on subsection 127(3.1).

[11] On August 6, 1985, I wrote to Revenue Canada to complain about the delay in their response and to make the first of my complaints that the rule of law required Revenue Canada to either admit what I had done with my "Contributor’s Choice Campaigning" as a candidate in the 1984 election was legal, or they should take legal action to try to prove that it was not. E.g., see the second and third paragraphs on the second page of my letter. {A.R. pp. 86 - 87}

[12] After I sent more letters of complaint and made telephone calls to Revenue Canada, they replied September 19, 1985. {A.R. pp. 90 - 93} The trial judge’s Order has identified this as the commencement of my cause of action for punitive damages. The trial judge’s Reasons {para. 92 & 137, A.R. p. 231 & 246} stated that Revenue Canada was first dishonest in 1985.

[13] Revenue Canada’s September 19, 1985, letter to me was written by Ms. Spice. (She was a lawyer, but employed as an officer of Revenue Canada, not at the Department of Justice.) The letter was signed by Mr. Read, Director of the Registration Division at Revenue Canada. Newbury J.A. quoted {para. 5, A.R. p. 258} a significant part of the letter Mr. Read signed. (But that was not the part of this letter that I objected to.) The trial judge quoted {para. 66, A.R. p. 220} the most important and crucial statement for the subsequent developments, that: "It is also our opinion that a scheme like the one proposed offends the object and spirit of subsections 127(3) and 127(3.1)." (But the lower courts have not examined "s. 127(3.1).")

[14] To summarize: the Chief Electoral Officer specifically raised the issue of s. 127(3.1), and I explicitly asked for a ruling on s. 127(3.1). Revenue Canada replied by stating that my CCC scheme offends the object of s. 127(3.1). Yet the lower courts have mostly ignored s. 127(3.1). The Reasons made no effort to analyse my freedom as different than my contributors’ freedom.

[15] The first "legal opinion" Revenue Canada obtained from the Department of Justice was on June 26, 1985. {A.R. pp. 154 - 155} The "legal opinion" emphasized political policy issues.

[16] The trial judge quoted from this "legal opinion" in her Reasons. {para. 65, A.R. p. 219} (Her quote has a clerical error in the second paragraph. She skipped over a significant clause.)

[17] An important statement made by Revenue Canada’s legal advisor was the conclusion that "we are not aware of any provision in the Income Tax Act which would stop this scheme." This legal knowledge was their fundamental dishonest awareness running throughout this case.

[18] Two of Revenue Canada’s Non-Corporate Rulings Division documents dated August 19, 1985, {A.R. pp. 88 & 89} stated their policy which they had decided to apply against me. These show there was an administrative policy to discourage by asserting dishonest nonsense.

[19] A memo dated September 20, 1985, shows that they knew the general policy was applied against me when Ms. Spice wrote the September 19, 1985, letter for Mr. Read. {A.R. p. 94}

[20] Their "negative" reply was based on a view that senior management officials at Revenue Canada thought that my CCC was "offensive and should be discouraged." They did "take the hard line approach and maintain that only the net amount represents a contribution, notwithstanding their thought that it does not represent the better view of the law."

[21] These statements are direct evidence of their fraudulent misrepresentation policy. It was an "administrative decision" that was not based on any reasonable interpretation of the law. Year after year, for more than a decade, these facts remained the same: (1) Revenue Canada made statements to me; (2) Revenue Canada knew their statements were false; (3) I relied upon Revenue Canada’s statements by telling others what Revenue Canada had told me; and (4) my telling others has caused an injury to me and resulted in a benefit to Revenue Canada. Throughout this time, it was obvious that Revenue Canada would not discuss nor reconsider their position, since they already knew that what they were saying was false. The only thing that Revenue Canada was interested in was attempting to make it impossible for me to get the chance to prove my CCC was legal and to make it impossible for me to ever fully use my CCC.

[22] Revenue Canada’s original policy was also confirmed in their 1988 "Media Response" by Revenue Canada. {A.R. pp. 149 or 24 - 25} Their court Defence consciously maintained it.

[23] As the trial judge observed {para. 34, A.R. p. 208}:

[24] The trial judge went on to quote Stubart in her para. 35 to 39, and in para. 54. I submit that her most important quote was in para. 39 where Mr. Justice Estey (at p. 576 f) spoke about the object and spirit "test" being against a transaction which had "the designed effect of defeating the expressed intentions of Parliament." I have emphasized that it says "expressed" intentions of Parliament, not unexpressed intentions. There was plenty of evidence of what the expressed intentions of Parliament were. (There is, of course, no evidence of the unexpressed.)

[25] The fundamental fact is that Revenue Canada deliberately ignored the law. The law which they ignored was in Stubart. (Revenue Canada did not like that the taxpayer won in Stubart.)

[26] Stubart has been clarified in subsequent decisions, however, it is still the law in Canada. Stubart, at p. 580 a - d, read in light of p. 576 f - g, did say that to not conform can invalidate.

[27] The dishonesty of Revenue Canada was manifested as their deliberate disregard for what Stubart says, along with contrived misappropriation of legal language from Stubart. Revenue Canada misappropriated Stubart by using an object and spirit test as an "argument" which had no basis in anything written anywhere in the law, nor in any admissible aids to interpretation. They ignored Stubart by claiming that s. 251 applied to everything in the Income Tax Act. Revenue Canada ignored that Stubart (at p. 580 h) confirmed the common law freedom that one is free to do any action which is not prohibited by law, and free to arrange one’s affairs in any lawful way that mitigates one’s taxes. (When Revenue Canada ignored the income tax law, they simultaneously ignored the law on damages, by assuming their dishonest policy was best.)

[28] The trial judge summarized the position that Revenue Canada maintained during the trial, as found in her Reasons, para. 31 - 33. Their crucial claim was noted at the end of para. 32:

[29] It is unlawful to assert that the irrelevant is relevant. As the trial judge stated in para. 53:

[30] Revenue Canada’s objection was not to the contributor controlling the use of their funds in the sense of suggesting the purpose for the agent to act upon. Revenue Canada’s objection was that the contributor could not obtain any personal benefit. According to Revenue Canada, the law would cut down the "amount contributed" to the "net amount" which was minus any personal benefit that was obtained by the contributor. Anyway, that is what they wrote to me, while they were fully conscious that "it does not represent the better view of the law."

[31] The idea that political contributions must be the same as charitable contributions is false.

[32] Revenue Canada knew that Parliament would have had to amend s. 127(4.1), or amend the elections law, in order to be able to deny personal benefit in ways that could stop my CCC.

[33] To stop what Revenue Canada did not like about my CCC, Parliament would have had to make political parties need to operate like they were closely analogous to registered charities.

[34] Revenue Canada knew that it was probably false to claim that political contributions are effectively the same before the law as charitable contributions. The assertion that my CCC did not conform to the object of the law was based on nothing but the prejudicial political morality that political contributions must be gifts made to political parties without any personal benefit.

[35] Revenue Canada has never tried to explain how my CCC discouraged more participation. Their misappropriation of Stubart used the legal language in Stubart to make their statements against obtaining personal benefit sound like they had the force of law. This misappropriation was their conscious policy of educated lies. This fraudulent misrepresentation of the law gave apparent legal force to opinions which were based on nothing but prejudicial political morality.

[36] Elections Canada confirmed that my CCC did not contravene the Elections Act, but that I still needed to ask Revenue Canada about it. {A.R. pp. 108 - 112} Mr. Read was replaced by Mr. Mohr on January 4, 1986. Mr. Mohr replied to me on March 19, 1986. {A.R. p. 113}

[37] Background to March 19, 1986 letter: It was written by Ms. Spice, signed by Mr. Mohr. The thrust of Mr. Mohr’s first letter in 1986 was against "an obvious personal benefit."

[38] Background to August 26, 1986, letter: It was written by Mr. Murray, the Chief of the Charitable Section, and signed by Mr. Mohr. {A.R. pp. 116 - 117} The thrust of this letter was that my Rhino Bursaries "would be subject to a disallowance." Their threat to disallow all but the "net" contribution was "intentionally misleading." {As trial judge stated in para. 92.}

[39] Background to September 25, 1986, letter: It was both written and signed by Mr. Mohr. {A.R. pp. 118 - 119} He wrote that my Rhino Bursaries transgressed s. 251. Mr. Mohr wrote to me the direct denial that: "Therefore no receipt can be issued in such cases." As he has admitted: (1) Mohr was not a lawyer; (2) Mohr did not do any legal research before writing his letter; (3) Mohr did not show his letter to any lawyer before sending it to me; (4) Mohr carried out the departmental policy when writing his letter; (5) Mr. Mohr, and his superiors, ignored my complaints that the threat to apply s. 251 against s. 127 was "legal nonsense." For 14 years Revenue Canada ignored the fact that the threat of s. 251 flatly contradicted Stubart. The strongest negative statements made to me by Mr. Mohr were ignored by the lower courts.

[40] Mr. Mohr had simply applied the department’s policy of stating dishonest legal nonsense. He knew that there was nothing to prohibit my Rhino Bursaries. He lied about that to stop me.

[41] An April 15, 1986, letter from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Venner {A.R. pp. 117 - 114} had stated:

[42] Revenue Canada’s view was that there was a "flaw in the wording" of the law because there was a lack of control in the legislation. They thought there was a "flaw in the wording" because personal benefit was not prohibited, which meant that I was free to legally provide it.

[43] Their Statement of Defence, para. 2, 5, 6, & 9, contained many explicit references to my "Rhino Bursaries," since Mr. Mohr had clearly stated that my "bursary" was "invalidated." Regarding "Rhino Bursaries," the Minister confirmed he "cannot condone the arrangement." {A.R. pp. 146 & 142} There were unequivocal assertions that Rhino Bursaries were not legal. To achieve their purpose, Revenue Canada knowingly abused their power to enforce the law.

[44] The officials’ attitude was a cynical complacency based on the assumption that the truth about the law did not matter and would never matter. Revenue Canada’s representatives were self-righteous liars. They decided to stop my agent business in the only expedient way possible.

[45] Their audit into my Bursaries was supposedly undertaken in order that Revenue Canada would know the facts on which their subsequent statements were based. Mr. Read’s October 8, 1985, letter {A.R. p. 95} stated: "An audit or investigation would only be undertaken where the Department had reason to believe [the receipts were] bogus and the amounts were material. ... it could lead to re-assessments or prosecutions depending on the circumstances."

[46] Examples of my Rhino Bursaries were in their audit. {A.R. pp. 120 - 123} "Note B & C"

Bursary to Alan Vichert [my tuition fee payment to University of British Columbia] $525.84

Bursary to Maryanne Vichert [my payment of a University of British Columbia fee] $525.84

[$1,100] was Contributed by Bruce Vichert - brother of Alan [to me as a registered agent]

Bruce Vichert - 1985 Political tax credit [amount claimed and honoured was] $483.33

Bruce Vichert gave me a cheque for $1,100, and I deposited his cheque into my bank account. I then wrote two cheques for $525.84 each, payable to the University of British Columbia, to be applied to payment of the tuition fees of Alan and Maryanne Vichert. (I earned $48.32 from the transaction.) Bruce Vichert later filed his receipt with the Minister of National Revenue. The Minister granted a $483.33 tax credit, never reassessed, despite saying he cannot condone. It was my duty under Income Tax Act s. 127(3.1) and Regulation 2000 to issue the correct receipt for the "amount contributed." That was linked through s. 127(4.1) to s. 127(3). Since my official receipt was for the legal amount contributed, Vichert’s tax credit claim was valid. The Income Tax Act is linked through s. 127(4) to the Canada Elections Act, and s. 13.1(7) was relevant to the consideration of my freedom, as protected by the Charter or common law. The trial judge mentioned in passing {para. 56, A.R. p. 216} that I had the rights or privileges of a registered agent, but the lower courts did not examine this reality in my Rhino Bursaries. In 1986, Mr. Mohr’s statements stopped the Vicherts from making more Rhino Bursaries. But I lost track of them, and could not call them as witnesses at trial, even if it was necessary. I did not call any witness besides myself to prove the terrible effect of Revenue Canada’s dishonesty.

[47] Mr. Mohr first wrote to Mr. Anglin, the Assistant Deputy Minister {A.R. p. 124 & 125}:

[48] However, Mr. Mohr finally wrote to Mr. McNab, General Counsel {A.R. p. 127}:

[49] Mr. Davidson’s "legal opinion" {A.R. p. 158 - 159} agreed with their last decision not to reassess nor prosecute, because their position was so weak that they would likely lose in court.

[50] The Chief of Audit believed {A.R. p. 128}: "Mr. Longley cannot appeal our opinion." Revenue Canada had expected that there was nothing I could do about their dishonest opinion.

[51] The trial judge {para. 75, A.R. p. 224} clearly realized that "Mr. Davidson was aware of no legal basis for the position that Revenue Canada was taking." The trial judge also drew an adverse inference that Mr. Anglin never got any "legal advice" that my CCC violated either the letter or the object of section 127. {Para. 79, which supports para. 94, A.R. p. 225 & 232}

[52] It was quite impossible for there to have been any evidence of legal advice that my CCC offended the object and spirit of the law. The only advice that could have said anything like that would have to be based upon nothing more than political prejudice. The evidence of the intentions of Parliament are statements about the ideals of a free and democratic society, which are consistent with my Contributor’s Choice Concept. I researched and designed it to be legal.

[53] The evidence of Parliament’s expressed intentions {A.R. pp. 166 - l89}, in the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (or the "Barbeau Report"), the House of Commons Debates, the Minutes of the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections, and in the Senate Debates, explicitly stated the purpose of the political contribution tax credit. It proves the trial judge’s finding that the object of the law was to encourage more political participation. My CCC was a real opportunity for Canadians to lawfully mitigate their taxes by registering bona fide political purposes. The legal truth about my CCC is the backbone to my whole case. The personal benefit obtained from controlling the expenditure of the contribution had no legal relevance. Politics is defined as "a struggle for power to influence or control a government." The prejudice against my CCC was really based on an idea that self-interest in politics is "bad." To deny the right to obtain personal benefit from participating in registered political activity is both false and destructive because it discourages participation. However, Revenue Canada has discouraged participation because Revenue Canada did not like the legal truth. Therefore, they decided to stop my CCC by being dishonest and saying that my Rhino Bursary was prohibited, despite knowing it was permitted. By abusing their power, Revenue Canada stopped my CCC. Their denial of self-interest monopolized the political marketplace of ideas. It excluded a truth.

[54] Paying tuition fees for post-secondary education obviously relates to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, and individual self-fulfilment. It fosters and favours association. My Rhino Bursaries were consistent with the fundamental freedoms in the Canadian Charter.

[55] While Revenue Canada was a department of Her Majesty’s government, it was then the single biggest in Canada. It was quite an invasive and most pervasively powerful organization.

[56] Revenue Canada officials were familiar with the Revenue Canada Taxation publication Declaration of Taxpayer Rights {A.R. p. 165}. This stated legal rights and freedoms in plain English language: "FAIR TREATMENT OF A COMPLAINT IS ONE OF YOUR GREATEST RIGHTS" and "YOU ARE ENTITLED TO EVERY BENEFIT ALLOWED BY THE LAW" Revenue Canada officials were very well aware that they were dishonestly violating my rights.

[57] The trial judge found this obvious fact, as stated in her Reasons {para. 137 A.R. p. 246}:

[58] The Minister defrauded his duty under ITA s. 220. Revenue Canada officials disregarded the law in the way they treated me as an individual. Revenue Canada simultaneously infringed on the lawful liberty of all taxpayers, however, the trial judge did particularize her finding that:

[59] Revenue Canada’s dishonesty impacted upon an individual with a Charter guarantee of freedom of association to be a registered agent. The trial judge noted {para. 56, A.R. p 216} that the Elections Act "sets out the duties, obligations and rights or privileges" which I enjoyed as a registered agent. (S. 13.1(7) obligated only registered agents to handle all money.)

[60] The trial judge’s first observation about why Revenue Canada had "refused to admit" that my CCC was legally correct was stated in her Reasons {para. 93, at point 1, A.R. p. 231}:

[61] Mr. Mohr was familiar with Revenue Canada Taxation Information Circular 78-3, and Information Circular 87-1, common law definitions of "political purposes" and "political activities." {A.R. pp. 160 - 164} These are normal definitions that I agreed with and adopted.

[62] The Federal Court of Appeal has several times adopted a definition of political purposes given by Lord Slade in McGovern v. Attorney-General [1981] 3 All E.R. 493 (Ch.D.) at p. 509. I agreed with the common law view of political purposes. But Revenue Canada’s claim that my political purposes must be altruistic was egregious hypocrisy as well as legal nonsense.

[63] Revenue Canada knew that I retold to other people what Revenue Canada had told me. Using ignorance and fear to control people is not consistent with a free and democratic society.

[64] Both Revenue Canada and I were aware that I could be prosecuted for a breach in my duty under s. 127(3.1), pursuant to s. 238. However, Mr. Davidson’s second "legal opinion" stated {A.R. p. 157}: "I would think that a denial of the tax credit to the contributors would be less open to criticism than a prosecution of Mr. Longley." Revenue Canada had tended to shift their threats to be more against my contributors, than against me, since that worked better from their point of view, since for them to threaten to reassess others worked much better than threatening me. Indeed, Revenue Canada easily got away with telling huge lies about the law. Their threats of legal reprisal worked mainly because of their credibility, and also because of their real enforcement potential. Their lies were quite effective because most citizens assumed that it was the truth. Very few citizens who had doubts about it were willing to fight it in court.

[65] The evidence supports this view stated by Newbury J.A. {middle of para. 17, A.R. 267}:

[66] Citizens believed that my CCC was not legal because of Revenue Canada’s dishonesty. The executive government has more power to lie and be believed than anyone else. All the dishonesty by Revenue Canada coerced me into the predicament of being their messenger. Revenue Canada’s statements of dishonest nonsense were a ball and chain shackled to my leg. That destroyed the national potential for my CCC. Revenue Canada had usurped the roles of both the courts and Parliament when they decided to say my CCC was not legal, and then confidentially treat my Rhino Bursaries as if they were legal, but still say that they were not.

[67] Between 1984 and 1988, I was responsible for issuing a total of about $10,000 in receipts for political contributions that Revenue Canada honoured for tax credits. {A.R. p. 24, 51 - 52}

[68] The trial judge {para. 93 & 135, A.R. p. 231 & 246} saw that I warned Revenue Canada about possible damages several times. These clear communications from me have proven that Revenue Canada thought about possible damages, but still decided to continue being dishonest.

[69] As the trial judge stated {para. 133, A.R. p. 245} during the time I was a registered agent "the level of contributions to the party through the vehicle of the CCC appears to have dropped from little to none." It has remained at "none" ever since up until the present. Thus, Revenue Canada has effectively put me out of the agent business and kept me out permanently.

[70] The lower courts have ignored all my correspondence with the Minister. {A.R. pp. 130 - 134, or 18 - 23, & 60 - 61 & 135 - 140 & 142 - 146} The only mention of the Minister’s involvement was that the trial judge noted the Minister was informed. {para. 77, A.R. p. 224}

[71] My letters to the Minister on March 13 & July 12, 1987, {A.R. pp. 138 & 145} stated:

[72] On June 8 & September 16, 1987, the Minister replied to me {A.R. pp. 142 & 146}:

[73] The Minister’s views were a patently unreasonable "fraud on the law." See Syndicat des Employés de Production du Québec v. CLRB [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412, at p. 420 d - g. The Minister ratified Revenue Canada’s policy of stopping contributions through my CCC by using statements of dishonest nonsense that my CCC was not legal and would not be allowed. This fraud on the law was perpetrated for the purpose it clearly achieved. It has stopped my agency.

[74] All the Minister’s and Mr. Mohr’s letters were unequivocal. {A.R. pp. 48 - 50, 38 - 48}

[75] The trial judge’s Reasons show a persistent pattern of understatement of the facts to the point where the facts were erased. (See her para. 2, 21, 93, 130, 133, and 137) By analogy to assault, it is like describing a punch in the face as a "refusal to shake hands." Revenue Canada went far beyond that they had merely "refused to confirm the legality of the scheme." They did not speak only of hypotheticals. They asserted that what I had actually done was not legal.

[76] The Further Amended Statement of Defence stated, in para. 2, 4, 5, & 13, as summarized:

[77] While my Amended Statement of Claim stated, in para. 12 & 13, as summarized:

[78] Obviously, Revenue Canada’s Defence deliberately lied to me, the public, and the courts. They argued seven times before the lower courts that my case should be summarily dismissed.

[79] At all times, Revenue Canada knew what was in their own documents. {Exhibits 2, 7, 8 and 9, A.R. pp. 81 - 146 & 154 - 159} Exhibits 5, 12, 13 and 26 were evidence of public facts.

[80] The trial judge did not review the whole of Revenue Canada’s Defence in light of the fact that they were found to originally have been dishonest. Instead of her finding that Revenue Canada’s Defence was patently unreasonable and plainly dishonest, she decided that they had stopped being dishonest in 1988 because they added the GAAR threat to the previous threats, and there was no documentary evidence that their GAAR threat, by itself, was dishonest. (Yet the previous threatening statements made by Revenue Canada had already stopped my CCC.)

[81] The lower courts ignored my Rhino Bursaries when judging what the remedy should be. Rhino Bursaries were described by the trial judge in her Reasons {para. 14, A.R. p. }, and by the court of appeal {A.R. p. point # 4}, but otherwise the lower courts have ignored them. (Evidence on these is scattered through the Record, but understanding it all is common sense.)

[82] In 1985, Revenue Canada’s dishonesty robbed me of the political opportunity to have some real influence by virtue of my Rhino Bursaries and my CCC. Political movements have a momentum to them. They can move forward with that momentum, but if they are stopped it can be difficult to get them going again. Everything that happened after September 19, 1985, was adversely affected by Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, which clearly achieved their purpose. The first focus of my cause of action for damages was the adverse effect upon my ability to make more Rhino Bursaries. They would have opened the door to using my CCC in general.

[83] Rhino Bursaries could have been an exchange of gifts, or job creation. {A.R. pp. 75 - 77, 28 - 37} See my December 6, 1985, Open Letter about Rhino Bursaries {A.R. pp. 105 - 107}.

[84] I tried to establish a working relationship with the U.B.C. student society (the "AMS") to bring Rhino Bursary opportunity to as many students as possible, in the most trustworthy way. In 1985, I confirmed it was legal for an agent to use a joint bank account, e.g. with the AMS, so that contributors would not have to trust me with their funds. {A.R. pp. 8 - 11, 97 - 100}

[85] Majority votes on the AMS student council motions indicated I had significant support by students. Those who voted for me in the student election, despite Revenue Canada’s position, indicated that I had substantial support amongst the students. {A.R. pp. 101 - 104, 78 - 80}

[86] There is evidence of the sabotage of the AMS motions by Mr. Jamie Collins and other members of the AMS executive. Jamie Collins’ published statement that my Rhino Bursaries were "a conspiracy to defraud the government" would not have been as possible to assert nor maintain without the letter from Mr. Read of September 19, 1985. {A.R. 102 & 90 - 93}

[87] Since 10% of the final tax credit benefit from a Rhino Bursary was agreed upon by the contributor to be left for me as an individual agent to decide how to spend, there was political and financial benefit that would have motivated me to try to make many more Rhino Bursaries. Rhino Bursaries represented an enormous political and financial opportunity for me to realize.

[88] In 1986, there were 13,250,000 taxpayers, and 124,000 of them claimed a total of only $10,800,000 in tax credits, which meant there was still a potential for $6,614,200,000 more that was never claimed. {A.R. pp. 153 & 27} More than 99% of taxpayers could have made Rhino Bursaries. The potential to make Rhino Bursaries in 1986 existed for about one million students. {Notice to Admit A.R. p. 148}. Using the CCC, most students who were supported by any taxpayers could have effectively cut tuition fees anywhere from 39% to 67.5%, without adversely affecting the quality of their education. I really could lawfully cut tuition fees in half.

[89] The Minister of Finance’s 1987 budget speech and White Paper was a few months after he had been informed about my CCC and Rhino Bursaries. He made education and tuition tax benefits transferable, which was analogous to my Bursaries in net effect. {A.R. p. 191 - 192}

[90] In 1988, $482,890,000 transferable tuition and education tax credits were claimed. {A.R. p. 152} Those who supported students had substantial interest in obtaining a tax credit benefit.

[91] The governing party might have decided to adopt the CCC, rather than to abolish it. My letters of March 5 and 16, 1987, to the Minister of Finance, described all the CCC potential. {A.R.. pp. 62 - 74} See his reply of May 8, 1987. {A.R. p. 141} (The governing political party was used to and depended upon the existence of the tax credit, and would have been affected.)

[92] But for Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, the only legal way that the government could have stopped me from making more Rhino Bursaries would have been to change the law. I would have been able to participate in a political debate regarding the merits of my CCC in that case.

[93] There were difficulties presented to Parliament to decide what to do. It would have taken time for Parliament to respond to the success of my CCC, which could have developed if only Revenue Canada had been honest. There would have been serious ramifications from enacting their proposed amendment to s. 127(4.1) to outlaw personal benefit. As stated in Parliament in 1977 {A.R. pp. 188 - 189}, it would create an "administrative nightmare" requiring "at least 100" more government employees to monitor and control parties, which would be expensive.

[94] Political opportunities are perishable. If Revenue Canada had been honest when I was a registered agent, then I had the legal power to do it. However, the dishonesty has isolated me. Now I am not a registered agent nor a party leader. Quijano J. para. 18 said: "In order for the CCC to work it was necessary that it be promoted by a registered political party." Without a registered party, I can not make any of my CCC inspired transactions. Therefore, I have been wiped off the political map. Their dirty tricks have knocked me right out of the political game.

[95] But for the tort, then some intensity and duration of participation was possible. My first goal was to increase the rate of participation in political parties up to 98%, as fast as possible. The potential success of the Student Party depended greatly upon the earlier success of my Rhino Bursaries, and having proven other successful uses of the CCC by me in the past, such as proving the first success of my Contributor’s Choice Campaigning during the 1984 election. Thus, Revenue Canada destroyed my ability to establish or maintain a registered political party.

[96] The political situation in Canada has devolved a lot since 1985. The remedy depends on the political situation that existed back in 1985 and 1986, not on the present political situation. My Contributor’s Choice Concept created a political opportunity for me to change Canada. Revenue Canada made sure I changed nothing. That was how I was injured and they benefited.

[97] It was a reasonably accurate estimate that the potential for Federal political contribution tax credit claims from 1985 to 1998 was about $99 billion, while all of the actual claims during that period added up to only $163 million, or less than 0.2%. (Newbury J.A. para. 24 used the word "adding" where her word should have been minus $163 million from the $99 billion.)

[98] More than 99.8% of the potential for the tax credit was never used. 99% of taxpayers do not claim any s. 127(3) tax credit. All the registered political activity in Canada was funded by only 1% of the taxpayers. (See Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 569, at para. 84.)

[99] While Revenue Canada was dishonest, it was a simple fact that the Federal potential for the use of my CCC added up to approximately one hundred billion dollars. It is reasonable and realistic to assume that, but for the tort, then some percentage of that potential would have been used, and it would have been greater than the total damages awarded by the lower courts. A just remedy must be some reasonable and realistic percentage of this potential which existed.

[100] Did both the trial judge and the court of appeal err in law by deciding Revenue Canada did not infringe upon my freedom of association, as guaranteed in Canadian Charter s. 2(d)?

General Issue: Are the financial affairs of registered political parties’ agents

protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

Special Issue: Did I have the freedom of association to solicit CCC political contributions?

Finding violation of Charter s. 2(d), not excused by Charter s. 1, leads to Charter s. 24(1).

[101] Did the trial judge and the court of appeal err in mixed fact and law by deciding Revenue Canada’s statements did not defame me, and I had no duty to tell others those statements?

[102] (The purpose of these two issues above is to reinforce my claim that the lower courts have grossly underestimated the just measure of damages against misfeasance in public office.)

[103] Did the lower courts err in logic to conclude that Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, and their misfeasance, stopped in 1988, despite that their original threats, such as applying s. 251, were maintained, without retraction, until November 26, 1999, when they abandoned their appeal? Was there no good reason to stop the damages in 1988? Do the consequential injuries to me continue against me for as long as there was no adequate remedy ordered by the lower courts? Do the consequences of the violation of my freedom of association injure me still now?

[104] Did the trial judge and the court of appeal err in the principles of the law used to assess the kinds and the quanta of compensatory damages?

Should there have been some aggravated damages in these circumstances?

Was the award of actual damages an erroneous assessment and inordinately low?

[105] Did the trial judge and the court of appeal err in the principles of the law used to assess a quantum of punitive damages? Did what Revenue Canada gained from their dishonesty to me exceed the quantum of punitive damages awarded by the lower courts? What did they gain?

[106] Did the trial judge and the court of appeal err in both fact and law by assuming a "null hypothesis" that, even if Revenue Canada had been honest, then nothing significant would have changed for me, nor would anything significant have changed for Revenue Canada? In other words, did the trial judge and the court of appeal err when they implicitly assumed that, but for the tort, then the probability of participation in my CCC would have been less than 0.00005%, and the related probability that the government would have changed the legislation was 0%?

[107] Did the trial judge and the court of appeal err by placing far too high a burden of proof upon me to prove what would have happened if Revenue Canada had been honest in 1985?

[108] After finding that Revenue Canada had been dishonest, did the trial judge and the court of appeal err by not assuming that taxpayers and electors relied upon that dishonesty? Should the principles of the law be applied to reverse the burden of proof on to Revenue Canada to require Revenue Canada to prove that taxpayers and electors did not rely upon the dishonesty?

[109] Did the lower courts fail to use common sense, or refuse to make reasonable inferences?

[110] After finding that Revenue Canada had been dishonest, did the trial judge and the court of appeal err in law by not applying the maxim omnia contra praesumuntur spoliatorem, and related legal principles, which assist the courts to serve justice the best they can by making reasonable assumptions of simple probability regarding hypothetical facts of what would have happened, but for Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, no matter how difficult that may be to do?

[111] Did the trial judge and the court of appeal err by placing none of the onus on Revenue Canada to provide evidence to make inferences of what would have happened, but for the tort? Who should get the benefit of the doubt when finding hypothetical facts? What was the most reasonable and realistic hypothetical situation to assume would have happened but for the tort?

[112] Freedom of association is necessary to a registered agent of a registered political party. Freedom of political association is at the very heart of the purpose of our Canadian Charter.

[113] The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed the concept of freedom of association in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 11:

[114] Sopinka J. had originally elaborated more on this in PIPSC v. N.W.T. (Commissioner) [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at p. 403 f - g:

[115] Dickson C.J. had stated in Re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1 S.C.R. 314, at p. 365 c - d & j:

[116] McIntyre J. also stated in Re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1 S.C.R. 314, at p. 397 d, f & h:

[117] Cory J. stated in PIPSC v. N.W.T. (Commissioner) [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, p. 379 g - j:

[118] Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, paragraph 26 quoted from R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, pp. 336 - 337, with emphasis:

[119] R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 334 c, established a principle, which the Supreme Court of Canada has since confirmed many times, that purposes are more important than effects in the law of our Canadian Charter. Therefore, the whole case at bar both can and should be judged on the basis of the finding of the following four purposes:

(1) It is trite law that a clear central purpose of freedom of association in Charter s. 2(d) was to encourage participation in the political process.

(2) The purpose of the political contribution tax credit was stated by the courts below:

(3) My purpose was to encourage participation in the political process, {A.R. 3, 5, et cetera} As stated by the trail judge {para. 63 & 29, A.R. pp. 218 & 206}.

(4) The purpose of Revenue Canada was to discourage participation in the political process,
as stated by the trial judge {para. 93 & 137, A.R. pp. 232 & 246}:

[120] The purpose of the Charter, the statutes, and my purpose were all to encourage more participation; meanwhile, Revenue Canada’s purpose was to discourage participation. Since Charter cases can and should be decided upon the plane of purposes, my claim can be decided by the prima facie recognition of the legal meaning that follows finding these four purposes.

[121] The essential errors were in the trial judge’s Reasons {para. 103 - 104, A.R. p. 235} and in the court of appeal’s Reasons {para. 19, A.R. p. 268} where Newbury J.A. wrote:

[122] Newbury J.A., in her first paragraph, set up a silly straw man in place of my real case:

[129] One approach to understanding my freedom of association is to think of what the law on "political contributions" would be if there was nothing said about it in the statutes. If both the elections law and income tax law said nothing about making financial contributions to political parties, then the common law theory of political contributions would apply. The common law "mandate theory" of a "political contribution" was stated by Lord Brightman in Conservative Central Office v. Burrell (Inspector of Taxes) [1982] 2 All ER 1 (C.A.) at p. 7 e:

[130] If the statutes were silent about political contributions, the contributor and the recipient would enjoy a freedom of association to make the arrangement described by Lord Brightman.

[131] Statutes intrude into the domain of the common law. It is axiomatic that whatever is not prohibited is permitted. When nothing is said about political contributions in any statute, then one has the freedom to solicit contributions and issue unofficial receipts. What the statutes do is create a legal duty for the registered agent to issue official receipts. There is no "freedom" to issue official receipts. It is a privilege to issue official receipts. That privilege is restricted by what these statutes prohibit. A registered agent enjoys political liberty to solicit contributions in any lawful way. Parliament can not neutralize the constitutional significance of the freedom of association needed to solicit political contributions by enacting a tax credit benefit for those contributions. The scheme of the legislation requires political activities to be registered, but allows no other registered political activity outside of the scheme. Soliciting contributions and issuing official receipts is a vital part of that overall scheme. To assert that my CCC is about nothing except money is to cynically ignore the clearly political context of all these statutes.

[132] For me to associate with taxpayers for the purpose of soliciting a political contribution is not "purely economic." Claiming a tax credit by the contributor is not the only bottom line in the case at bar. There surely is much more to it! The better bottom line is the amount of participation in the political process. The tax credit was an incentive to increase participation. Nothing in the law prohibited using personal benefit as an incentive to encourage participation.

[133] When Revenue Canada’s statements discouraged taxpayers from claiming their political contribution tax credits, those statements discouraged taxpayers from associating with me for the purpose of making contributions and registering political purposes. It was wrong to cut off obtaining tax credits from the whole process of association that has generated the tax credits.

[134] Revenue Canada acted with the utmost bad faith to interfere with pre-existing freedom.

[135] The Court should judge the effect upon my freedom of association caused by Revenue Canada’s statements. First, they intended to discourage taxpayers from contributing to me and claiming their tax credits. Second, they succeeded. In both ways it infringed upon my freedom to associate with taxpayers for my purpose of soliciting political contributions, after taxpayers had been told that Revenue Canada had asserted that my official receipts were not legally valid. When a person has a legal right to freely do something, but the government dishonestly denies that lawful right and stops the enjoyment of it, then it is logically obvious the government has nullified that lawful right and infringed upon the freedom to participate in that lawful activity. S. 2(d) protects nothing material if s. 2(d) does not protect my freedom to solicit contributions.

[136] To paraphrase from NWAC v. Canada et al. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, at p. 655 b - c, or 667 a - g, when the government provides a legal means of association, such as association in a registered political party, then established rules of Charter scrutiny should continue to apply. (My website computer search of Supreme Court of Canada judgments produced six cases at "100%" for "freedom of association," but with many dissenting judgments in those six cases).

[137] The trial judge in para. 102, as noted by Newbury J.A. in para. 9, relied in part upon Stasiuk v. Her Majesty the Queen [1986] 2 C.T.C. 346 (F.C.T.D.). Neither that judgment, nor the Tax Court decision before it (85 D.T.C. 613), ever mentioned Charter section 2 once. The lower courts considered not even one high court case which actually talked about Charter s. 2(b) or 2(d). (I have not argued the s. 2(b) aspect, because there is no room in my factum to discuss it, and, if this court case was a chess game, then freedom of association would be my queen.) I submit that it was surpassingly absurd to assert that to stop my contributors from claiming legal tax credits had no effect upon my ability to associate with them. This "threat to withhold" their tax credits did infringe upon my freedom to associate with all my contributors!

[138] Stasiuk should be distinguished from the case at bar. The trial judge applied Stasiuk backwards since my CCC scheme did not lack "the formal validity required by that section." My freedom to continue to solicit and spend any unregistered funds for political purposes was not relevant to the infringement of my freedom to solicit and spend registered funds. It was bizarre for the trial judge to say: "It was still open to them to direct funds in whatever legal way they wished for the purpose of making a political statement." What about my legal CCC?

[139] The real conflict over my CCC was about the legal truth regarding my CCC, and about political participation in my CCC, and about personal benefit from participation in my CCC. Charter s. 2(d) is analogous to s. 2(b) in the value of participation: R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 728 a, & at p. 764 a & 766 g; R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at p. 136 d; RJR-Macdonald v. Canada (A.G.) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at p. 280, para. 72; R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, at p. 752 b - i; Com. Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, at p. 172 f - j; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 346 e.

[141] The case cited by Quijano J. in her para. 130, Taylor-Wright v. CHBC-TV [1999] B.C.J. No. 334 (S.C.) (Q.L.), in its para. 22, relied on this definition as "one of the best tests."

[142] By a broad purposive definition, defamation of a member of a group by the government violates freedom of association, since the member’s ability to work with the group is impaired. The fact that Revenue Canada’s purpose was to stop people from making contributions to me means there is no doubt that this was an intentional tort. That there was misfeasance meant that Revenue Canada’s treatment of me was done in a way for which they had no authority in law, and they knew that they had no authority in law, and they not only could foresee but also intended the injury which was done to me. Of course Revenue Canada knew the relevant facts.

[143] Revenue Canada knew how their dishonest statements were being maintained, and they knew the statements were being communicated to other people. Any qualified privilege present in this situation was destroyed by their dishonesty, chicanery, and persistent willful blindness.

[144] It was not defamatory to "refuse to admit" that my activity was legal. However, it was defamatory to dishonestly assert that my activity was illegal. The systematic understatement of the facts by the trial judge has taken the sting out of my defamation. That has erased my case.

[145] Contrary to both Quijano J. {para. 129, A.R. p. 243} & Newbury J.A. {para. 18, A.R. p. 268} I can rely upon Brown’s The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at pp. 7-19 to 7-22, to show that a defendant can be held liable for damages in defamation where the plaintiff was under some real duty or a moral obligation to republish the defendant’s libel to others, and the defendant knew of that. Revenue Canada’s letters to me were statements of their official departmental policy. Their official policy on income tax law is public in nature. Their letters were to me and about my activities, but their policy was public.

[146] It would have been dishonest and dishonourable for me not to have warned taxpayers what Revenue Canada had told me before soliciting their contribution. That is plainly obvious!

[147] The facts were that taxpayers disassociated from me, and they did not contribute to me.

[148] My contributor’s choice arrangement should be judged as a whole. There are four steps to the arrangement: (1) I associate with a contributor for the sake of soliciting a contribution; (2) I issue an official receipt to the contributor for the amount contributed; (3) I then spend the contributed funds according to the political purpose indicated by the mandate given to me by the contributor; and finally, (4) the contributor may file their official receipt with the Minister of National Revenue in order to claim their political contribution tax credit. The lower courts have examined or cared only about step (4). I submit that error extremely prejudiced my case.

[149] The errors of the lower courts effectively cut me out of my case. The lower courts erred to say Revenue Canada’s statements were not defamatory of me personally. They did that by ignoring my role under s. 127(3.1), as that related to me in the 1985 Rhino Bursary test cases.

[150] Reference to s. 127(3.1) was explicitly written into all the letters from the beginning. Recall the quote taken from Revenue Canada, as stated by Quijano J. {para. 66, A.R. p. 220}:

[151] I emphasize that subsection 127(3.1) required that:

[152] To have the political activity one is promoting branded as illegal by a law enforcement agency injures one’s reputation. Revenue Canada’s written words were defamatory since they imputed that I had been engaged in an illegal conduct by my violation of subsection 127(3.1).

[153] What Revenue Canada dishonestly said about s. 127(3.1), if it were true, would mean that I was liable to imprisonment according to section 238. (S. 238 is a strict liability offence. It does not depend upon finding fraud, as needed in s. 239.) That consequence is at the far end of aspersions which are defamatory, since the degree of stigmatization caused by an aspersion depends upon the consequences of that aspersion if it were true. It is defamatory to say that a professional person had done something in the course of their professional activities that would make them liable to imprisonment. Revenue Canada maintained that my Rhino Bursaries were really not legal in a way that would be punishable as an offence against the law. To dishonestly accuse a person of that kind of behavior, i.e. contravention of s. 127(3.1), for which they could be individually held accountable before the law for an offence, is defamatory. It is defamatory of me personally because of s. 127(3.1). To look only at s. 127(3) totally ignores my own role.

[154] It is defamatory to impute to a person in any office misconduct in that office or unfitness or lack of ability to perform their duties. (Gatley on Libel and Slander, 8th Ed., para. 57 - 58 & 168.) Being a registered agent, before I was put out of business, was a profession or an employment for me. (See McElroy v. Cowper-Smith and Woodman [1967] S.C.R. 425, at p. 426; and Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 66.)

[155] According to Revenue Canada’s letters to me, my actual, audited, Rhino Bursaries had violated both the letter and spirit of the law, and therefore they would not be allowed and could not be condoned. That is literally what their letters, particularly the last two from Mr. Mohr and the two from the Minister, the Hon. Elmer MacKay, said to me in black and white. I, in fact, showed those letters to potential contributors, and being informed of what Revenue Canada had written to me did stop other people from associating themselves with my activity.

[156] Since Rhino Bursaries were lawful, it can not be that Revenue Canada was in any legal way justified in stopping my registered agent business. But nevertheless, they did stop me!

[157] There is a glaring internal contradiction in the Order saying there was no defamation but then nevertheless awarding me $5,000 in "actual damages" for "loss of reputation." It makes no sense to say there was actual loss of reputation, but no defamation. The $5,000 amount for two weeks of injury from September 1, 1988, to September 13, 1988, was patently arbitrary. Quijano J. {para. 134, A.R. p. 245} as quoted by Newbury J.A. {para. 15, A.R. p. 266} stated that there was "no persuasive evidence" what my political reputation was worth. However, there is no persuasive evidence what the intangible right to vote and democracy is worth either.

[158] The context of the case at bar places it right at the heart of the Canadian Charter. That makes my political opportunity and my reputation worth a lot more than a measly $5,000. My reputation belonged to me. See Hill v. Church of Scientology [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, pp. 1174 - 75, para. 106 - 108, & at p. 1179, para. 120, where it said: "the protection of the good reputation of an individual is of fundamental importance to our democratic society."

[159] Quijano J. {in para. 128} stated that there was no documentary evidence of dishonesty behind the scenes at Revenue Canada after 1988, and thus their misfeasance stopped in 1988.

[160] Newbury J.A. {para. 23, A.R. p. 270} noted that I "seemed to contest the finding that Revenue Canada’s misfeasance did not continue after the introduction of the GAAR." Newbury J.A. {para. 12, A.R. p. 264} gave an "explanation" for why there was an end to misfeasance in 1988. The GAAR threat was made when I was organizing the Student Party, and maintained against the "Contributor’s Choice Campaigning" that I arranged when I was a candidate in the 1988 general election, after the GAAR became law. I submit that the Court should consider the law on "willful blindness" in the context of the trial judge’s para. 80 & 94. "There is no evidence that the Department had legal advice that the scheme ... offended the object and spirit of s. 127." The basis of the GAAR threat was nothing but the same prejudice.

[161] My argument that Revenue Canada’s misfeasance continued is based on logic, not on evidence. The trial judge’s conclusion was illogical. The court of appeal simply ignored that.

[162] The logical point that I insist upon is that the GAAR threat was simply stacked on top of the original threat to apply section 251. The threat to apply s. 251 was dishonest, but that threat was maintained in Revenue Canada’s Statement of Defence and maintained at the trial in 1997. It makes no sense to say that the misfeasance stopped. The original dishonesty asserted by Revenue Canada did not stop until Revenue Canada did not appeal, or rather abandoned their appeal in 1999. That is why I argue that Revenue Canada’s misfeasance ran continuously from 1985 to 1999. The GAAR threat was superfluous because that did not change anything.

[163] Revenue Canada was already able to stop any increase in participation by their assertion that s. 251 made my CCC illegal. Their threat to apply s. 245 did not add anything, but also the GAAR did not subtract anything from my case. The GAAR did not stop my original case.

[164] The trial judge {para. 123 & 128, A.R. pp. 241 - 243} rightly said that the GAAR can not stop my CCC as long as I have a bona fide political purpose. The GAAR could not stop a Rhino Bursary, since the true primary purpose of that transaction was my bona fide purpose. Encouraging more participation by association with a party was my primary bona fide purpose.

[165] The only potential issue that mattered was whether the GAAR might be able to stop my CCC. Quijano J. rightly decided that it can not. My CCC never offended the object of the law.

[166] The simple logical point is that Revenue Canada did not stop being dishonest until they admitted that they had been dishonest. They did not admit that they had been dishonest until they abandoned their appeal on November 26, 1999. On the contrary, the way they conducted their Defence was to still maintain their dishonest nonsense was the truth. Their dishonesty and refusal to admit they were wrong was an extreme aggravation continuously from September 19, 1985, up until November 26, 1999. It is quite ludicrous to say a person has stopped being dishonest as long as they are claiming that what they said was true. Logically, it is even worse and more dishonest to reassert the original dishonesty as still being the truth. Revenue Canada maintained a Defence in court that was nothing more than a cover-up of their first dishonesty.

[167] Since the GAAR can not stop my CCC, it was irrelevant. It was merely one more threat. I submit that the lower courts’ error here was simply another excuse to minimize the damages.

[168] Revenue Canada did not stop being dishonest until they were finally forced to after a court judgment based upon an overwhelming amount of evidence against them. Hence, there is no good excuse to be found to stop the damages meter from having been constantly running. (See Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at pp. 256-58, para. 67-72, and Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581, at p. 613, para. 81.)

[169] Damages should not stop because I waited until 1990 to commence my action against Revenue Canada. (See McGillivary v. Kimber (1915) 52 S.C.R. 146, at pp. 163 and 172.)

[170] The courts stop actions which try to pre-empt or by-pass a statutory appeal process. In the context, they would have stopped a premature legal action by me against Revenue Canada.

[171] While it is true that the courts may entertain an action for a declaration, they usually will decline to do so when it is possible and more proper to go through another established way. If there had been any reasonable doubt whether my Rhino Bursaries were legally valid, Revenue Canada should have either prosecuted me for failing to comply with s. 127(3.1), or reassessed my contributors for them failing to be within s. 127(3). Such action would have been consistent with Revenue Canada’s statements to me, but doing neither was a part of their dishonesty. My action depended on Revenue Canada having never prosecuted nor reassessed due to my CCC.

[172] The Supreme Court of Canada is the guardian of our Constitution and the final judge of how the law should be enforced in Canada. It can order any remedy under Charter s. 24(1). The purpose of the remedy is to enforce a freedom that our democracy can not exist without. The freedom to enjoy an association of electors in a registered political party was deliberately encouraged by Parliament, but then deliberately discouraged by Revenue Canada’s dishonesty.

[173] With my CCC, making a personal benefit from registered political activity available to taxpayers was the means towards increasing participation, and thus making democracy work better. However, my conflict with Revenue Canada degenerated to become a cause of action for which damages paid by the government to me was the normal legal remedy, while my first goal of increasing participation was buried. The remedy has done too little to stop that injury.

[174] The Charter violation had cumulative consequences during several general elections. During those elections, I lost the chances to participate fairly and freely with my lawful CCC.

[175] The legal theory of my case is based on my individual freedom as an agent, candidate and/or party leader. None of the damages in my case depend upon the violation of the rights of my contributors. My case is not a class action case. (The Rhino and Student political parties have ceased to exist and, back before 1988, they were not legal persons that could be "parties" in this court action, see Elections Act s. 13.8.) The structure of the legal theory of my case is that Revenue Canada caused injury to me in a way that resulted in benefit for Revenue Canada. This benefit was correlated with the injury done to all the taxpayers, but the injury to taxpayers does not make my case. S. 127(3) and s. 127(3.1) are necessarily linked, but my case is based mostly upon s. 127(3.1), and Elections Act s. 13.1(7). The denial of the legality of my official receipts had different effects upon me than taxpayers. Revenue Canada stopped other people from claiming tax credits, but has infringed upon my freedom of association, and defamed me. Compensation for me flows from the injury done to me as individual. Punitive damages follow from the amount of benefit Revenue Canada has gained from their violating my political liberty.

[176] I received no aggravated damages for intangible injuries done to me by Revenue Canada treating me "in such a high handed, arrogant and dishonest way." {para. 141, A.R. p. 248}

[177] The trial judge {para. 131, A.R. p. 244} stated a wrong view of aggravated damages. To say that "aggravated damages include punitive damages" was preposterously wrong. That demonstrated a deep failure to understand the legal principles of both these kinds of damages. She referred to only one authority. On that one, she stated a view that was quite totally wrong.

[178] Newbury J.A. {para. 14, A.R. p. 265} erred to dismiss the trial judge’s mistake here as "immaterial." See Huff v. Price (1990) 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 282 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 299 - 300, on aggravated damages, and their relationship to punitive damages. The greatest intangible injury which has been done is that my faith in the reality of the rule of law in Canada was destroyed.

[179] The just measure of aggravated damages depends on the effect of Revenue Canada’s dishonesty upon me, rather than upon other people. Even if no one else cared about Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, I cared. Even with the "null hypothesis" of the lower courts with respect to the hypothetical facts, the intangible injuries to me were directly attributable to my knowing that Revenue Canada was treating me "in such a high handed, arrogant and dishonest way." (See statements about how I felt while Revenue Canada screwed me. {E.g. A.R. pp. 12 - 17})

[180] Consider the aggravating factor that Revenue Canada was dishonest for 14 years, not 3.

[181] Revenue Canada’s Defence in court shamelessly repeated outrageous lies for ten years.

[182] I have spent the better part of sixteen years of my life fighting against Revenue Canada’s dishonesty. None of that would have been necessary if Revenue Canada had been honest in the first place. Therefore, by not having to spend my time and money fighting Revenue Canada in court, I could have had the opportunity to have done anything else. I submit that the lower courts have ordered a remedy that has punished me. I am worse off now than if I had never attempted to fight Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, since all the time I had to spend to "win" my case means that I have been working for less than minimum wage. If the lower courts have the final say in the case at bar, one must then conclude that it is quite foolish to take legal action against government officials who have been "high handed, arrogant and dishonest," since the cost of fighting to prove that in court is greater than the remedy one receives after proving it. If so, public officials will tend to expect most citizens who experienced unlawful government action would not attempt to fight that in court, since it will so surely end as a Pyrrhic victory.

[183] As ordered by the trial judge {A.R. p. 194}, the grand total Revenue Canada has had to pay me was about $84,000. (I.e. $55,000 damages, $22,000 costs, and about $7,000 interest.)

The Order of Quijano J. awarded me $50,000 in punitive damages for a cause of action that she said began on September 19, 1985, and ended September 13, 1988.

The Order for $5,000 in actual damages was for a cause of action that she said began on September 1, 1988, and ended on September 13, 1988.

[184] The trial judge decided there was three years of dishonesty generating punitive damages, but only two weeks of actual damages, before the GAAR became law September 13, 1988.

[185] Newbury J.A. said nothing in her judgment on appeal about the issue of actual damages.

[186] The trial judge’s Reasons {para. 133 & 134, A.R. p. 245} have simply skipped over the assessment of any actual damages in 1985, 1986, and 1987, only to stop at the last two weeks of misfeasance in 1988. Her assessment of my "actual damages" has excluded consideration of compensation for injuries done while I was a registered agent who had a lawful right to make Rhino Bursaries. All my Rhino Bursary registered agent business in the first three years was totally by-passed. However, if honesty would not have changed anything significant, then the dishonesty had no real meaning. It is effectively the same as erasing the fact of their dishonesty.

[187] The bifurcation point in the history of the case at bar was when Revenue Canada could first have been honest enough to write a letter in 1985 that admitted there was nothing in the income tax law which could stop my CCC. After that, an identical set of hypothetical facts should be assumed by the Court for assessing both the compensatory and punitive damages. However, the same set of hypothetical facts serve different purposes for the different damages.

[188] When the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was passed by both Canadian and British House of Commons, Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, at pp. 1221 - 1228, and Broome v. Cassell & Co. [1972] A.C. 1027, at pp. 1079 C - D, 1094 B - D, 1126 C - E, 1130 C - F, & 1134 B - C, had then stated the just legal principles regarding punitive damages.

[189] Newbury J.A. saying that the trial judge had been "generous" to me indicated that she did not understand the principles at stake, since all punitive damages are necessarily a windfall. (See again Broome, supra, at pp. 1126 C - E and 1134 B - C.) The only alternative to the use of punitive damages to provide real deterrence, despite a windfall effect, is to condone the tort. Newbury J.A. made a serious legal error in the following quote {para. 25, A.R. p. 272 - 273}:

[190] The different damages serve different purposes. In my punitive damages, the issue is the benefit Revenue Canada has gained by means of their dishonesty to me. After finding that I had been the victim of punishable behavior, the issue of the quantum of punitive damages does not depend on the amount of injury to me, but rather on their benefit gained from injury to me.

[191] Stopping my Rhino Bursaries resulted in ten times as much financial benefit to Revenue Canada as the loss to me. (The political injury to me was intangible.) The "remedy" ordered by the lower courts has assumed that there would have been less than $50,000 in total CCC tax credits, from 1985 onward, after Revenue Canada had admitted the legal truth about my CCC. The problem is that an issue of "personal benefit" accumulated for many years into the remedy.

[192] What Newbury J.A. said about my view {para. 24, A.R. p. 272} was correct principles which are supported by high and binding authority. But what she said in para. 25 about my approach being "fanciful in the extreme" was her failure to recognize the correct principles. Weiss Forwarding Ltd. v. Omnus [1976] 1 S.C.R. 776, at pp. 778 - 779, stated a trial judge should face the facts that required punitive damages, no matter how difficult that may be to do.

[193] To the best of my knowledge, there is not any jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada about how the courts should remedy constitutional torts due to dishonest government. Vorvis v. I.C.B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, at pp. 1104-1109, & Hill v. Church of Scientology [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at pp. 1208-1209, clearly stated the principles of punitive damages to be applied generally. Augustus v. Gosset [1996] 3 S.C.R. 268, at p. 309, para. 77, indicated that:

[194] Austin v. Rescon Const. (1984) Ltd. (1989) 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 21 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 25, and Epstein v. Cressey Development Corp. (1992) 65 B.C.L.R. (2d) 52 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 57, apply by analogy since Revenue Canada "trespassed" against my rights. Ashby v. White et al. (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938; 92 E.R. 126, at pp. 136-37 & 139, indicated the principles in Huff v. Price (1990) 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 282 (B.C.C.A.), at pp. 296 & 300, apply to intangible rights. Stopping my Rhino Bursaries had both intangible political effects and direct financial effects.

[195] Rookes, supra, at p. 1226, identified two categories of cases most requiring deterrence. One is "oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government," and the others were "those in which the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff." On p. 1227 it was asserted that "it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay." Lord Devlin went on to discuss "three considerations." (1) the plaintiff must have been "the victim of punishable behavior," and (2) the quantum should defend liberty, and (3) how the quantum would impact on the defendant had to take into account the wealth of the defendant.

[196] The legal principles in Rookes were summarized in Vorvis, supra, at p. 1104 i - 1105 a. Vorvis, supra, at p. 1106 a, says the quantum depends upon the benefit that Revenue Canada obtained by violating my freedom, but not on their benefit from violation of others’ freedom.

[197] Consider what Revenue Canada knew, then go through the authoritative legal test for punitive damages stated in Broome, supra, at pp. 1079 C - D, 1094 B - C, and 1130 C - F. Revenue Canada collected more tax revenue by being dishonest than they would have if they had been honest, while they robbed me of the opportunity to exercise some political power and influence by virtue of my creative, lawful, CCC. As the trial judge said in para. 93 and 135, I warned Revenue Canada many times about the possibility I would sue for damages. However, the Minister, while he acknowledged my letters, ignored my warnings that I would sue because of Mr. Mohr’s letters. E.g. my December 15, 1986, letter clearly warned the Minister {at pp. 1, 4, & 5; see A.R. pp. 130 - 134, or again at A.R. pp. 18 - 23, and through pp. 41 - 47}:

[198] Revenue Canada thought about damages, and then decided to continue being dishonest. The Broome test applies to my letters of complaint. The lower courts have ignored all of this.

[199] As in Wilkes v. Wood (1763) Lofft. 1; 98 E.R. 489, at p. 490, I am asking the Court to erect a lighthouse on the case at bar: a beacon of hope to restore faith that there is reality in the rule of law. The remedy should enlighten us about the rule of law. A real remedy provides a realistic quantum. The Court has a duty to enforce the law with meaningful punitive damages.

[200] "Punishment" does not even begin until the damages exceed the benefit Revenue Canada obtained. Damages that are anything less than the benefit Revenue Canada obtained have not punished but rather really reward Revenue Canada. Tort truly does pay if the remedy is trivial. Token fines are merely a "license fee" that allow a defendant to act in an intentionally unlawful way, and end up better off, despite the sum of damages eventually paid. (See Hill at p. 1209, para. 199; Vorvis at pp. 1125 e - 1126 a; Austin, at p. 25; and Epstein at p. 57, para. 12.)

[201] Public officials contemplating any intentionally unlawful action, motivated by political, moral, or economic beliefs, will probably not be deterred by the knowledge that the worst that can happen is that the government may have to pay damages many years later which amount to no more than a token fine against the government. Since rights and remedies are reciprocal — one can not exist without the other — citizens’ rights have no existence other than the courts’ enforcement of rights. Enforcement is in the quantum, which is linked to the ideals of the law.

[202] Without a remedy that provides a genuine, effective and objective deterrence, then the ideal that there is government according to the law will merely be rhetoric without any reality. Without effective enforcement, then there really is no rule of law. After the Court applied the common law principles of punitive damages, then the quantum would become large enough to make public officials in the future think that they ought to never risk those kind of damages by acting in an unlawful and dishonest way. Otherwise, public officials will know that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain from being dishonest, when they have political, moral, or economic opinions which motivate them to be dishonest, as long as those motivations are greater in importance to them than the later hazard of litigation whose worst possible outcome would be a pittance to them in damages and costs to be eventually paid by the Crown.

[203] The law has a presumption that public officers regularly act in a lawful way, as has been expressed in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta. That the courts approach the acts of the government with this presumption increases the need for effective enforcement when the government has been found to breach it. As stated in Ashby, supra, at p. 137: "If publick officers will infringe men’s rights, they ought to pay greater damages than other men, to deter and hinder other officers from the like offences." As was recognized necessary in Rookes, supra, at p. 1223, the final quantum must be sufficient to insure that "the exemplary principle ... serves a valuable purpose in restraining the arbitrary and outrageous use of executive power." The lower courts did not order the "greater damages" truly necessary to really deter.

[204] A trial judge may have a discretion to order additional damages to punish exceptionally bad conduct. However, it is a big error in a principle of the law not to use damages to stop the wrongdoer from keeping a benefit obtained from exceptionally bad wrongdoing. According to common sense, the lower courts’ errors were perverse in their overall effect. Their "remedy" has certainly guaranteed that it has paid Revenue Canada to stop my CCC by being dishonest.

[205] The two main errors of the lower courts were (1) they refused to find that taxpayers and electors relied upon Revenue Canada’s dishonesty, and (2) they demanded that I prove what the level of general interest in participation would have been, but for the tort. Using common sense, judges should do the best they can to assume what would have happened. The Court should not resort to the excuse that I have not completely proven what was impossible for me to prove, namely, prove what would have happened if the way things had originally transpired was that Revenue Canada had written me a letter admitting that my CCC was not prohibited. It was unreasonable and unrealistic to assume that this tort had practically no effect on me at all. The details about my circumstances on the U.B.C. campus in 1985 and 1986 were the relevant circumstances and the original context of my case. The Court may use common sense in a way that is consistent with legal presumptions in order to make reasonable inferences based directly on knowing the meaning of the legal truth about my Rhino Bursary opportunity and my CCC.

[206] My position is that it is corrupt for the Court to condone a constitutional tort committed against an individual representing a loyal opposition political party. It follows that any excuses used to effectively condone a constitutional tort are corrupt. It is hypocrisy to say that Canada is governed by the rule of law, if the principles of the law regarding punitive damages are not effectively enforced against a dishonest government. No real remedy results in no real freedom.

[207] The fact that taxpayers ultimately pay has no legal relevance. If the executive of the Crown can use such a shield, there never would be any remedy. If the fact that taxpayers end up paying has any relevance, it is the opposite of an excuse not to order punitive damages — the more taxpayers are angry about having to pay punitive damages, the more they, as citizens, will act to stop the government from behaving in an intentionally unlawful way against others.

[208] No matter how hard the call, judges must act as the referees in the long game of politics.

[222] Pursuant to Supreme Court Act s. 45, I ask the Court to give the judgment the lower courts should have given. I ask for the finding of defamation and violation of Charter s. 2(d).
I ask for a real remedy under Charter s. 24. I ask the Court for greater damages and interest.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY ____________________

Dated                                 Blair T. Longley, Appellant

NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT:

Pursuant to s. 44(1) of the Rule of the Supreme Court of Canada, this appeal will be inscribed by the Registrar for hearing after the respondent’s factum has been filed or on the expiration of the time period set out in paragraph 38(3)(b) of the said Rules, as the case may be.